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Abstract—This paper uses principal-agent theory to examine the optimal
mix of monetary- and resource-based penalties in two institutional
settings: a market economy and a centrally planned economy. In a centrally
planned economy, an agent’s wealth depends mostly on real resources and
little on monetary resources; therefore, monetary-based penalties have less
penalizing power than do resource-based penalties. Based on this premise,
theory generates hypotheses regarding differences in the optimal mix of
penalty types between the two economic systems. This paper empirically
tests these hypotheses using data from the Czech Republic regarding
enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents (such as oil spills).
I. Introduction
THIS paper considers the optimal mix of penalties in twodifferent types of economic systems: a market economy
and a centrally planned economy. In either economic
system, the operations of an enterprise may cause an
accident, such as an oil spill, which imposes costs on society.
These costs prompt a government authority to establish a
liability law to deter the enterprise from causing an accident.
The liability law imposes two types of penalties: monetary-
based fines and resource-based remediation requirements
(such as the mandatory removal of oil-soaked soil). How-
ever, the relative value of money differs between the two
economic systems, which causes the two types of penalties
to generate different degrees of deterrence, which thus alters
the optimal mix of penalties.
A principal-agent framework effectively structures the
interaction between an enterprise and government authority
(Shavell, 1979) and facilitates the exploration of the optimal
penalty mix (Cohen, 1987). Accordingly, this paper exam-
ines the principal-agent relationship between an agent, who
engages in a risky activity that causes stochastic externali-
ties, and a principal, who seeks to control these events by
penalizing the agent. Unlike previous research (Cohen,
1987), this analysis examines the principal-agent relation-
ship in two different institutional settings: a market economy,
where the agent is motivated by monetary proceeds (profits),
and a centrally planned economy, where the agent is
motivated by output (plan fulfillment) and inputs (hoarding).
The principal-agent relationship differs substantially be-
tween these two institutional settings.
Due to soft budget constraints1 and agents’ (enterprises’)
desires to fulfill the ‘‘plan’’ in a centrally planned economy,
agent wealth depends mostly on real resources and only to a
limited degree on monetary resources. Therefore, in a
centrally planned economy, monetary-based penalties have
much less penalizing power than do resource-based penal-
ties. Given that the principal is trying to provide the proper
incentives to control stochastic externalities in both eco-
nomic systems, the principal-agent framework generates
testable hypotheses concerning the use of each penalty
component in the two economic systems. If economic
restructuring alters the principal’s objective, in addition to
the value of money, then the principal-agent framework
generates modified hypotheses concerning the relative use
of each penalty component.
As an empirical test of these hypotheses, this paper
examines data on the enforcement of water-protection laws
in the Czech Republic from 1988 to 1992, a period that spans
both aforementioned economic systems.2 In particular, this
paper analyzes enforcement actions taken in response to
water-damaging accidents (such as oil spills).3 To capture
these actions, this study exploits unique and rich data
maintained by the main enforcer of water laws, Czech Water
Inspection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
broadly addresses principal-agent relationships in different
economic systems and articulates the hypotheses. Section III
describes the Czech enforcement process and the database
on accidents. Section IV provides econometric analysis of
enforcement actions and empirically tests the hypotheses.
Section V summarizes the results.
II. Principal-Agent Framework
A. Principal-Agent Relationships in Different Economic
Systems
The principal-agent relationship associated with the con-
trol of stochastic externalities is substantially different in a
centrally planned economy than it is in a market economy.
Although many aspects of the economic system affect the
relationship, this analysis focuses on the agent’s composi-
tion of wealth, especially its influence on the effectiveness of
individual components within the penalty mechanism avail-
able to the principal. In a market economy, money has the
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1 An enterprise faces a soft-budget constraint when it does not need to
cover its long-run costs (for example, when state subsidies allow an
in olvent enterprise to remain in business).
2 For the purposes of this analysis, the years 1988–1990 are regarded as a
central planned economy and the years 1991–1992 as a transitional market
economy, as noted in section IIIA.
3 Certainly, some of these events were not caused accidently. Neverthe-
less, the principal-agent model still appropriately applies.
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ability to command real resources for the agent’s use so that
the agent’s wealth depends on money through profits.
Because both monetary fines and the costs of required
remediation reduce profits and thus wealth, they must
similarly penalize an agent.4 In a transitional market economy,
in which economic activities are not centrally managed yet
market institutions are incomplete, money has a greater
ability to command real resources (that is, it affects wealth
more strongly) than in a centrally planned economy.
In a centrally planned economy, the standard assumptions
concerning money’s ability to command real resources and
the associated agent’s composition of wealth appear to be
violated. Under centralized arrangements, the ‘‘plan’’ allo-
cated most resources to enterprises (agents). Although
monetary funds were needed for the ‘‘purchase’’ of these
production inputs, universal subsidization of enterprises
generally provided the necessary funds. Because central
planning did not allocate resources perfectly and shortages
of essential inputs existed, enterprise managers frequently
desired an exchange of real resources. In response, enter-
prise managers established elaborate webs of personal
relationships for trade in resources, mostly according to a
barter system (Grossman, 1977; Ericson, 1984). Thus,
money played a relatively minor role at the enterprise level.
Given universal subsidization and a second economy
based mostly on barter, enterprise management had little
incentive to maximize profits; instead, enterprise manage-
ment had significant incentives to fulfill the plan because
bonuses, tenure, and status in the Communist party hinged
on plan fulfillment and past fulfillments (Litwack, 1991).
Thus, rather than money or profits, enterprise management
sought real resources in order to fulfill the plan; that is, the
agent’s wealth depended primarily on real resources and to a
much less degree on money.
Money’s limited ability to command resources and the
agent’s desire for plan fulfillment imply different penalizing
powers for monetary- and resource-based penalties under
central planning. Monetary-based fines are neutralized by
subsidization, while resource-based remediation require-
ments divert real resources away from production. Thus,
monetary fines should have much less penalizing power
relative to remediation in a centrally planned economy.
Moreover, monetary fines should have much less penalizing
power under central planning relative to a market economy.5
The optimal penalty mix depends on the absolute penaliz-
ing power of monetary fines under central planning. Two
cases exist:
case 1: monetary fines have some penalizing power
under central planning.
case 2: monetary fines have no penalizing power under
central planning.
Under case 1, government authorities can maintain the real
penalizing power of monetary fines by inflating their nomi-
nal levels. Therefore, in real terms, the absolute and relative
use of monetary and remedial penalties does not differ
between the two economic systems, only the nominal level
of monetary fines. This logic generates hypothesis 1: nomi-
nal monetary fine levels, conditional upon remediation
levels, are greater under central planning relative to a market
economy, while remediation is required evenly across
economic systems. Under case 2, authorities cannot main-
tain the real penalizing power of monetary fines; instead, it
collapses to zero. Therefore, the optimal penalty mix under
central planning eliminates monetary fines and relies exclu-
sively on remedial penalties.6 This logic generates hypoth-
esis 2: remediation requirements should be emphasized
under central planning relative to a market economy, while
monetary fines should be emphasized, conditional upon the
level of remediation, in a market economy relative to a
centrally planned economy. (Earnhart (1999) provides a
formal principal-agent model that generates these hypoth-
eses.)
This logic also extends to the likelihood of penalty
imposition as long as imposition is costly. First, consider the
imposition of each penalty type separately. Under case 1,
monetary fines and remediation requirements are equally
likely between the two economic systems. This prediction
represents a variant of hypothesis 1 and is noted as
hypothesis 1A. Under case 2, monetary fines are less likely
in a centrally planned economy than in a market economy,
while remediation requirements are more likely in a cen-
trally planned economy than in a market economy. This
prediction represents a variant of hypothesis 2 and is noted
as hypothesis 2A. Second, consider the imposition of the
two penalty types jointly. Certain events may require only
remediation, in which the benefits of fine imposition do not
warrant the cost. Some events may not warrant remediation,
in which only a monetary fine is sufficient. Other events may
require both penalties or neither penalty. Given this perspec-
tive, under case 1, the sole use of either penalty and the joint
use of both penalties is equally likely between the two
economic systems; this prediction constitutes hypothesis 1B.
4 This study does not explore reputational penalties borne by agents. S e
Karpoff and Lott (1993) for analysis on these penalties.
5 This logic implicitly assumes that the importance of real resources is
constant between the two economic systems. In reality, economic restruc-
turing may also affect the importance of real resources. For example,
reduced commercial opportunities in the transitional market economy of
the Czech Republic may cause resources to sit idle, thus reducing their
importance. If true, this change would actually bolster the perspective that
the importance of monetary resources relative to real resources increased
in the market economy. In general, we need only assume that any increase
in the importance of real resources not exceed the purported increase in the
importance of monetary resources.
6 This conclusion does not rely on monetary fines being completely
worthless under central planning. If monetary fines have an upper limit
(which is true in the case of water-damaging accidents in the Czech
Republic), then monetary fines need only be sufficiently worthless to make
their imposition unproductive. In other words, the benefits of imposing
even the highest possible fine are less then the cost of imposition.
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Under case 2, the sole use of monetary fines and the joint use
of both penalties is less likely in a centrally planned
economy than in a market economy, while the sole use of
remediation requirements is more likely in a centrally
planned economy than in a market economy; this prediction
constitutes hypothesis 2B.
B. Principal’s Objective Differs between Economic Systems
The logic used to generate these hypotheses assumes that
the objective of the principal does not differ between the two
economic systems. In reality, the Czech government authori-
ty’s objective may differ greatly. To establish a vibrant
market economy of thriving private enterprises, the Czech
principal may have increased its concern for preventive
effort expended by and penalties imposed upon enterprises
(agents). Conversely, the transformation of the economic
system roughly coincided with a transformation of the
political system from a communist system to a democratic
system. This transformation generated a dramatic change in
the priorities given to environmental protection. Although
the communist regime often disregarded the environment,
the democratic regime, upon ascendance, took major steps to
improve the environment (Czech Ministry of the Environ-
ment, 1990). These substantially different environmental
perspectives may have prompted the Czech principal to
increase its concern for averting stochastic externalities and
for reducing environmental damages.7 In either case, a
change in the principal’s objective would alter the chosen
levels and imposition likelihoods of penalties, ceteris pari-
bus. In the first case, levels and likelihoods of both monetary
fines and remediation requirements would be lower in the
market economy than in the centrally planned economy,
ceteris paribus; in the second case, the opposite result
follows.
Similarly, the principal-agent logic assumes that the
principal’s objective concerns only societal wealth. From a
political-economy perspective, the principal may also wish
to appear tough on enforcement. In particular, Czech water
authorities may wish to impose remediation requirements
and monetary fines to display their environmental conscious-
ness to the Czech citizenry and Western countries, a practice
called ‘‘show.’’ Obviously, this additional concern would
prompt the principal to increase the chosen level of each
penalty and its likelihood of imposition. In this regard for
show, the principal’s objective may also differ between the
two economic systems. Most likely, the communist regime
possessed greater desire for show, causing the levels and
likelihoods of both penalties to be higher in the centrally
planned economy than in the market economy, ceteris
paribus.
Obviously, the original hypotheses may not be robust to
these changes.8 However, the hypotheses are robust if they
are restated in terms of relative penalty use, rather than
absolute penalty use. First, consider case 1. Regarding
penalty levels, the ratio of remediation level to monetary fine
level is greater in the market economy than it is under central
planning: hypothesis 1C. Regarding penalty imposition, the
following relative uses of penalties are equally likely
between the two economic systems:
1. joint use of both penalties relative to the sole use of
remediation;
2. the joint use of both penalties relative to the sole use of
monetary fines; and
3. the sole use of remediation relative to the sole use of
monetary fines.
These predictions constitute hypothesis 1D.
Second, consider case 2. Regarding penalty levels, the
ratio of remediation level to monetary fine level is smaller in
the market economy than it is in the centrally planned
economy, a prediction that constitutes hypothesis 2C. Regard-
ing penalty imposition, the joint use of both penalties is
more likely, relative to the sole use of remediation, in the
market economy than it is in the centrally planned economy;
that is, conditional on the imposition of a remediation
requirement, a monetary fine is more likely in the market
economy. Conversely, the joint use of both penalties is less
likely, relative to the sole use of monetary fines, in the
market economy than in the centrally planned economy; that
is, conditional on the imposition of a monetary fine, a
remediation requirement is less likely in the market economy.
Similarly, the sole use of remediation, relative to the sole use
of monetary fines, is less likely in the market economy than
it is in the centrally planned economy; that is, conditional on
the imposition of a penalty, remediation is less likely and a
monetary fine more likely in the market economy. These
predictions collectively constitute hypothesis 2D.
III. Responses to Water-Damaging Accidents in the
Czech Republic
Using data on enforcement actions taken in response to
water-damaging accidents in the Czech Republic from 1988
to 1992, the subsequent empirical section tests these theoreti-
cal hypotheses concerning absolute and relative penalty use.
A. Characterization of Economic Systems
Using data from the Czech Republic to test these hypoth-
eses is very appropriate because this country has experi-
enced a stark change from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy. At the time of communism’s collapse in
November 1989, the former Czechoslovakia was one of the
7 Although the environmental perspectives apparently differ, the water-
protection laws and the rules guiding their enforcement vary little between
the two political regimes.
8 The original hypotheses remain true if the effect of any change in the
principal’s objective is sufficiently small relative to the effect of the change
in money’s importance.
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most strict centrally planned economies in Central and
Eastern Europe. As of 1986, the state sector generated 96.7%
of net material product (NMP) and the nonfarming private
sector generated only 0.7% of NMP (Svejnar, 1995). Since
communism’s collapse, the Czech Republic has rapidly
transformed itself towards a thriving capitalist economy as
evidenced by the withering presence of state control over
enterprises and prices, and by the emerging presence of
private ownership and markets. In 1991, central planning—
the system of production quotas and guaranteed sales—was
abolished, 90% of all prices were deregulated, and small-
scale privatization and restitution began (Svejnar, 1995). In
1992, transfers to the business sector in the state budget
decreased, market institutions were introduced, and mass
privatization began. By the end of 1992, most of the service
industry was privately owned, and 50% of construction
activity was privately generated; nevertheless, only 14% of
industrial production was privately generated (Svejnar,
1995).
Even though private ownership was still incomplete by
1992, the transitional market years of 1991 and 1992
represent an economic system that is dramatically different
than the centrally planned system in place during 1988 to
1990. The empirical analysis accepts this division between
economic systems mainly because 1990 is the last year when
a ‘‘plan’’ was implemented.
B. Legal Efforts to Protect Water Quality from
Water-Damaging Accidents
Using data on water enforcement to test the hypotheses is
also appropriate because the Czech government has good
reason to be concerned about its country’s water quality and
water-damaging accidents. In 1985, only 17% of total
surface water was classified as clean and as much as 22%
was classified as extremely polluted.9 Moreover, water-
damaging accidents have significantly degraded water qual-
ity in the Czech Republic (Czech Ministry of the Environ-
ment, 1990). Table 1 shows the annual number of water-
damaging accidents from 1988 to 1992. Since the end of
communist rule in 1989, the number of accidents has
steadily declined. Certainly, the substantial decline in eco-
n mic activity during this period—real GNP declined 20.7%
between 1989 and 1992—may explain much of this drop.
Equally as plausible, monetary fines with real penalizing
power may have begun to deter polluters from causing
accidents.
Czech environmental authorities treat water-damaging
ccidents as potential violations of statutes banning the
improper handling of substances harmful to water (1973
Water Act No. 138, hereafter the ‘‘Water Act,’’ §23–24).
Once a water-damaging accident is detected, water authori-
ties can impose remediation requirements and monetary
fines, according to the Water Act (§27) and the 1974 State
Water Administration Act No. 130 (hereafter the ‘‘Water
Administration Act,’’ §24c). Although no general procedure
for imposing remediation requirements exists, the Water
Administration Act (§24c) guides monetary fines according
to several factors, including remediation costs. According to
a Czech Water Inspection official, a firm’s profitability and
status in the privatization process also entered into monetary
fine decisions during the capitalist transition (Pu˚lpán, 1993).
In particular, the official claims that the agency is ‘‘going
easy’’ on privatizing firms with respect to monetary fines.
Such behavior is consistent with the increasing effectiveness
of monetary fines. Given that monetary fines had some
penalizing power under central planning, as fines become
9 Source: Czech Hydrometeorological Institute.
TABLE 1.—ENFORCEMENT RESPONSESTO WATER-DAMAGING ACCIDENTS, 1988–1992
1.a. Imposition of Individual Penalties
Year Accidents










1988 584 300 41,659,881 138,866 44 9,276,627 210,832
1989 654 340 31,960,463 94,001 361 26,244,884 72,701
1990 598 268 22,325,103 83,303 170 12,077,124 71,042
1991 501 209 12,888,024 61,665 43 9,449,791 219,763
1992 415 149 10,119,702 67,917 41 19,661,021 479,537
Note: Czech Crowns deflated by Consumer Price Index for the Czech Republic [Source: Czech Statistical Office].
1.b. Combinations of Individual Penalties: Frequency of Penalty Package Selection
Year Neither Penalty Remediation Only Monetary Fine Only Both Penalties
1988 176 11 265 33
1989 119 91 100 240
1990 175 50 156 112
1991 215 12 184 25
1992 174 11 125 24
Source: Czech Water Inspection.
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more effective in the transitional market period, the agency
optimally reduces their magnitude.
By law and in practice, water authorities can and do
impose remediation and monetary fines simultaneously
(Water Act, §27, 47). Table 1 presents a recent history of
enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents. As
shown, the annual number of accidents prompting a mon-
etary fine has greatly decreased since 1988, even after taking
into account the drop in accidents. More important, the
average monetary fine imposed has dropped significantly.
This decrease is in keeping with the Czech Water Inspec-
tion’s purported policy of ‘‘going easy’’ on privatizing firms
(reducing the size of monetary fines). In the case of
remediation, the average cost imposed has greatly increased
since 1989, even though the number of remediation require-
ments in 1991 and 1992 is only a fraction of what was
demanded in 1989 and 1990. As a whole, remediation may
have been applied evenly across the two economic periods.
Collectively, these results seem to support the notion that
monetary fines had some penalizing power in the centrally
planned economy (case 1). However, hypothesis testing
derived from multivariate analysis generates a different
conclusion.
C. Database on Water-Damaging Accidents
Since 1988, the Czech Water Inspection—the main en-
forcer of Czech water protection laws—has maintained a
database on individual water-damaging accidents, which
includes penalties of required remediation costs (adjusted to
1992 levels), and monetary fine (adjusted to 1992 levels).
The database also contains variables relevant to the Czech
water authorities’ decisions to impose penalties. Of these
variables, this study utilizes the following:
1. type of water affected (for example, groundwater),
2. primary cause of the accident (for example, human
error),
3. secondary cause of the accident,10
4. economic activity of the responsible party (for ex-
ample, agriculture),
5. location of the accident by Czech Water Inspection
region,
6. year of the accident;
7. measured damages caused by the accident (adjusted to
1992 levels); and
8. type of contaminant involved (for example, oil).
The year and location of the accident can be linked to the
surface-water quality (represented by biological oxygen
demand) of the Czech Water Inspection region affected by
the accident.11 The year of the accident places each observa-
tion in an economic system.12 The Czech Water Inspection
database contains a total of 2,710 accidents, and the Czech
water authorities detected the responsible party in 2,298 of
these cases. Because penalties cannot be imposed on uniden-
tified polluters, these observations are dropped from the
sample. (Complete data documentation is available upon
request.)
IV. Econometric Analysis of Water-Damaging Accidents
Using the described data, I formally test the hypotheses
discussed above as they relate to the enforcement actions
that were taken in response to water-damaging accidents in
the Czech Republic.
A. Structuring the Outcome Relationships and Estimation
Techniques
Econometric analysis estimates the decision process to
impose penalties from three perspectives. The first decision
perspective concerns the imposition of each penalty type
separately, while ignoring penalty levels. This perspective
proves useful if water authorities divide accidents into two
categories—impose penalty or not impose—according to
the costs and benefits of penalty imposition, while treating
the need for each penalty type separately. This perspective
permits the testing of hypotheses 1A and 2A. The second
decision perspective concerns the imposition of both penal-
ties jointly by examining the selection of a penalty combina-
tion from four possibilities: neither penalty, remediation
only, monetary fine only, and both penalties. This perspec-
tive proves useful if water authorities divide accidents into
the four noted categories according to the costs and benefits
of penalty imposition, while treating the need for penalties
jointly. This perspective permits the testing of hypotheses
1B, 1D, 2B, and 2D. The third decision perspective concerns
the joint determination of the levels for required remediation
costs and imposed monetary fines. This perspective permits
the testing of hypotheses 1, 1C, 2, and 2C.
In turn, I examine all three decision perspectives. For each
perspective, I estimate two separate econometric models
based on the sample time period. Model 1 uses data for 1988
to 1990 (the centrally planned economy), and model 2 uses
ata for 1991 to 1992 (the transitional market economy).
The data is not pooled, because structural breaks in the three
regression systems exist between the two economic systems.
Estimates of the coefficients that are common to the two
10 In some cases, two factors contribute to the cause of the accident. The
Czech Water Inspection determines which factor is primary and which is
secondary.
11 Although many parameters may represent surface-water quality, the
most prominent parameter is biological oxygen demand, as it is reported in
the Czech Water Inspection’s yearbooks.
12 The database lacks some key explanatory variables—ownership of the
enterprise (private or state), the profitability of the enterprise, and the
organizational structure of the enterprise—that would be especially helpful
to establish the efficacy of monetary fines.
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models, as a group, differ significantly between the eco-
nomic systems for each decision perspective.13
Penalty Imposition—Each Penalty Type Treated Separately:
Consider the first decision perspective which treats each
penalty type separately. The regression system involves the
following dependent variables:
r d 5 1 if remediation is required, and
5 0 otherwise; and
md 5 1 if a monetary fine is imposed, and
5 0 otherwise.
The independent variables include a constant, indicator
variables for the primary causes (unknown/natural cause as
benchmark), an indicator variable for the secondary cause
(‘‘not human error’’ as benchmark), measured damages,
indicator variables for the economic activity of the respon-
sible polluter (heavy industry as benchmark), an indicator
variable for the type of water affected (surface water as
benchmark), surface-water quality, and indicator variables
for the type of contaminant (‘‘other’’ contaminant as bench-
mark). Model 1 includes indicator variables for 1988 and
1989 (1990 as benchmark); model 2 includes an indicator
variable for 1991 (1992 as benchmark). Define the complete
set of independent variables asZ.14 The regression system is
then structured as follows:
r d 5 a8Z 1 er ,
md 5 c8Z 1 em,
where er and em are the unobserved determinants for the
required remediation equation and the monetary fine imposi-
tion equation, respectively. As one way of estimating the
discrete choice of each penalty imposition, I make the probit
(Maddala, 1983) assumptions and estimate the regression
system with maximum-likelihood techniques. Estimation
results are shown in table 2. Penalty Imposition—Penalty Types Treated Jointly:To
model the second decision perspective (selection of a
specific penalty combination), this paper employs discrete-
choice, random-utility theory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman,
1985). For each accident (indexed byn), the water authority
chooses the penalty combination that yields the highest
utility of all alternative combinations. LetK denote the
choice set of combinations: no penalty, only remediation,
only monetary fines, and both penalties. Within this perspec-
tive, the probability of choosing combinationi is equal to the
probability that the utility of combinationi, Uin, is greater
than or equal to the utility of all other combinations in the
choice set:
Pr (i 0K) 5 Pr [Uin $ Ujn, ; j [ K ].
13 For the first decision perspective, the Wald test statistic for remediation
is 107.95, significant at the 1% level, and the Wald test statistic for
monetary fines is 21.54, significant at the 15% level. (For analytical
consistency, I choose to stretch the level of appropriate significance rather
than to pool the data for this one equation.) For the second decision
perspective, the Wald test statistic is 103.43 and significant at the 1% level.
For the third decision perspective, the Wald test statistic for remediation
costs is 61.56, significant at the 1% level; the Wald test statistic f r
monetary fines is 27.15, significant at the 10% level; and the Wald test
statistic for the penalty level ratio is 26.82, significant at the 5% level.
14 In the case of monetary fines, the independent variables additionally
include a zero-damage spline, which takes the value 1 when measured
damages equal 0, and the value 0, otherwise. I omit the zero-damages
spline from the estimation of remediation requirements because the
measurement of damages and the requirement of remediation are highly
correlated.
TABLE 2.—PROBIT ESTIMATION OF REMEDIATION REQUIREMENTS AND
MONETARY FINES
Variable









Constant 20.475** 20.993** 0.699*** 0.313



















Transport cause1 0.826*** 0.349 0.039 20.085
(0.153) (0.380) (0.138) (0.206)
Technical cause1 0.658*** 0.686** 0.193* 0.195























— — 20.378*** 20.057
(0.094) (0.255)
1988 or 19913 20.966*** 0.047 0.227*** 0.155



































Groundwater5 20.009 0.244* 0.094 0.156*











Oil contaminant6 0.253*** 0.221 0.081 0.207













1,528 770 1,528 770
Log-likelihood 2748.865 2186.310 2910.147 2477.136
Standard errors noted inside parentheses.
a5 excluded due to insufficient variation in the data.
*, **, *** indicate statistical differences from zero at significance levels 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
r spectively.
Omitted indicator categories: 15 Unknown/Natural Causes; 25 Not Human Error; 35 1990 or 1992;
4 5 Heavy Industry; 55 Surface Water; 65 Other Contaminant.
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In this random utility framework, overall utility,Uin, is the
sum of a deterministic component,Vin, and a random
component,ein: Uin 5 Vin 1 ein. If the random component is
an identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) type I
extreme value with scale parameter µ, the probability that
the water authority in the case of accidentchooses
combinationi rather than combinationj, denotedpn(i ), takes
the logit form as follows:




Thus, estimation of the deterministic component,Vin per-
mits the calculation ofpn(i ). I modelVin as an indirect utility
function linearly conditional onZ, the explanatory variables,
and b, the parameter vector:Vin 5 b8Z. I estimate this
regression system using multinomial logit-estimation tech-
niques. (Complete estimation results are available upon
request from the author.)
Penalty Levels: Finally, consider the third decision perspec-
tive (determining levels of required remediation costs and
imposed monetary fines). The dependent variables are
r 5 costs of remediation requirements, and
m 5 monetary fine level.
Censoring affects both dependent variables. Required reme-
diation costs are bottom-censored at zero: 1,689 of the 2,298
accidents prompted no remediation. According to the Water
Administration Act (§24), the monetary fine is bottom-
censored at 10,000 Kcs and top-censored at 1,000,000 Kcs
(both in nominal terms). Because the legal limit applies to
nominal values, the inclusion of a top limit forces the
analysis to estimate each individual year separately. More-
over, this inclusion fails to alter significantly the coefficient
estimates.15 As further evidence, an examination of the data
reveals that top censoring appears to be unimportant: the
maximum monetary fine is imposed in only five cases.
Consequently, the top-censoring problem is ignored. Also
upon examination, the bottom-censoring problem for mon-
etary fines actually occurs at 0 Kcs, not 10,000 Kcs.16As one
way of handling this complication, I make the Tobit
(Maddala, 1983) assumptions and estimate the regression
system with maximum-likelihood techniques. Estimation
results are shown in table 3.
To test the modified hypotheses concerning relative
penalty use, econometric analysis estimates the ratio of
penalty levels. First, the analysis constructs the ratio of
required remediation cost levels to total penalty levels:
r/(r 1 m). This construction allows calculation of a ratio
even when only one penalty type is imposed. Second, the
nalysis restricts the sample to accidents prompting the
imposition of at least one penalty type. Otherwise, the
constructed ratio is undefined, becauser 1 m5 0. The ratio
varies between 0 and 1 and censoring affects the ratio at both
end values. As one way of handling this complication, I
make the two-limit Tobit [Maddala (1983)] assumptions and
estimate the ratio with maximum likelihood techniques.
Estimation results are shown in Table 4.
B. Hypothesis Testing
To test the hypotheses, the analysis calculates and com-
pares the predicted values of the dependent variables for the
two economic systems. For the imposition of each penalty
type and the selection of a particular penalty combination,
the predicted values apply to the probability of imposition
and selection, respectively. For the levels of each penalty
type and the ratio of penalty levels, the predicted values
apply to levels and the ratio, respectively. To facilitate the
comparison of economic systems, let CPE denote the
centrally planned period (1988–1990) and MKT denote the
transitional market period (1991–1992). To calculate the
predicted values, the analysis evaluates the explanatory
variables at their sample means for each separate economic
system, denotedXCPE and XMKT.17 For each dependent
variable, the difference between the predicted value for one
economic system and the predicted value for the other
system measures the emphasis of penalty use in one system
relative to the other. In turn, this subsection calculates and
evaluates these differences for the three decision perspec-
tives: imposition of each penalty type treated separately,
selection of a penalty combination, and determination of
penalty levels, including their ratio.
Imposition of Each Penalty Type Treated Separately:Con-
sider the first decision perspective. Define the following
predicted probabilities of penalty imposition in economic
systemj, evaluated atXj, wherej [ 5CPE, MKT6:
Pr
j (Xj) 5 predited probability of imposing remediation
requirement in economic systemj, and
Pm
j (Xj) 5 predicted probability of imposing a monetary
fine in economic systemj.
For each penalty type, then define the difference between the
predicted probability of imposition in the MKT system and15 Wald test statistics for the years 1988–1992 are 0.008, 0.001, 0.186,
0.057, and 0.002, respectively, and significant only at levels greater than
10%.
16 Of course, I cannot rule out the possibility that a certain percentage of
the accidents are bottom-censored at 10,000 Kcs and the remaining
accidents are not.
17 The sample mean for the entire period of analysis (1988–1992) is not
considered for evaluation because structural breaks between the two
economic systems appear in each regression system.
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and DPm(Xj) 5 Pm
MKT (Xj) 2 Pm
CPE(Xj).
As constructed, these differences measure the emphasis
placed on each penalty type in the transitional market period
relative to the centrally planned period. According to these
estimated measures, as shown in table 5a, water authorities
significantly emphasized remediation under central planning
and monetary fines in the transitional market period consis-
tent with hypothesis 2A.
This first decision perspective does not allow the testing
of relative penalty use because it ignores potential overlap of
the two imposition decisions. To overcome this problem, the
analysis turns to the second decision perspective involving
the selection of a penalty combination, which accommo-
dates this overlapping of penalty imposition.
Selection of Penalty Combination:Consider the second
decision perspective. First, examine the selection of various
penalty combinations relative to the imposition of ‘‘neither
penalty.’’ Define the following predicted probabilities of
selecting a particular penalty combination relative to neither
penalty in economic systemj, evaluated atXj, where j [
5CPE, MKT6:
Pro
j (Xj) 5 predicted probability of selecting a
combination involving remediation only
relative to imposing neither penalty
in economic systemj,
TABLE 3.—TOBIT ESTIMATION OF REQUIRED REMEDIATION COSTS AND MONETARY FINE LEVELS
Variable









Constant 2267,240*** 2958,010** 21,251 63,133*
(78,570) (406,000) (41,027) (38,067)
















Transport cause1 224,430*** 429,110 246,441* 233,973
(56,320) (316,100) (26,988) (22,960)
Technical cause1 214,720*** 638,500** 3,752 8,009
(50,680) (308,200) (22,882) (21,596)
















Zero-damages spline — — 234,036** 263,004***
(16,762) (22,158)
1988 or 19913 2263,360*** 217,956 69,095*** 10,962



















Citizen activity4 2452,640*** 206,170 21,359,607 2717,622









Groundwater5 48,609* 237,900** 8,759 16,912*









Oil contaminant6 48,861 233,390 16,375 23,177*
(36,650) (167,200) (17,547) (14,438)
Chemical contaminant6 52,839 266,990 15,556 14,233
(44,420) (190,800) (21,683) (17,014)
Number of observations 1,528 770 1,528 770
Normal standard deviation 399,160 811,750 230,648 123,264
Log-likelihood 28,013 21,204 212,833 24,920
Standard errors noted inside parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical differences from zero at significance levels 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Omitted indicator categories: 15 Unknown/Natural Causes; 25 Not Human Error; 35 1990 or 1992; 45 Heavy Industry; 55 Surface Water; 65 Other
Contaminant.
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Pmo
j (Xj) 5 predicted probability of selecting a
combination involving a monetary fine only
relative to imposing neither penalty
in economic systemj, and
Pb
j (Xj) 5 predicted probability of selecting a
combination involving both penalties relative
to imposing neither penalty in economic
systemj.
For each penalty combination, then define the difference
between the predicted probability of selection in the MKT
system and the predicted probability in the CPE system, both
evaluated atXj:
DPro(Xj) 5 Pro
MKT (Xj) 2 Pr
CPE(Xj),
DPmo(Xj) 5 Pmo
MKT (Xj) 2 Pmo
CPE(Xj), and
DPb(Xj) 5 Pb
MKT (Xj) 2 Pb
CPE(Xj),
where j [ 5CPE, MKT6. As constructed, these differences
measure the emphasis placed on each penalty combination
(relative to no penalty) in the transitional market period
relative to the centrally planned period. According to these
estimated measures, as shown in table 5b(i), water authori-
ties significantly emphasized the sole use of remediation
under central planning, consistent with hypothesis 2B. In
addition, water authorities significantly emphasized the sole
use of monetary fines and the joint use of both penalties in
the centrally planned period, inconsistent with hypotheses
1B and 2B. These last results strengthen the need to test the
hypotheses of relative penalty use.
To test the relative use of remediation requirements and
monetary fines, consider the selection of various penalty
combinations relative to the imposition of remediation only
or a monetary fine only. Define the following predicted
probabilities of selecting a particular penalty combination
relative to an alternative combination in economic systemj,
evaluated atXj, wherej [ 5CPE, MKT6:
[Pb/Pro] j(Xj) 5 predicted probability of selecting
a combination involving both
penalties relative to remediation
only in economic systemj,
[Pb/Pmo] j(Xj) 5 predicted probability of selecting a
combination involving both
penalties relative to a monetary fine
only in economic systemj, and
[Pro /Pmo] j(Xj) 5 predicted probability of selecting a
combination involving remediation
relative to a monetary fine only in
economic systemj.
For each penalty combination, then define the difference
between the predicted probability of selection in the MKT
system and the predicted probability in the CPE system, both
evaluated atXj:
D[Pb/Pro](XCPE) 5 [Pb/Pro]MKT (Xj) 2 [Pb/Pro]CPE(Xj),
D[Pb/Pmo](XCPE) 5 [Pb/Pmo]MKT(Xj) 2 [Pb/Pmo]CPE(Xj), and
D[Pro/Pmo[(XCPE) 5 [Pro/Pmo]MKT(Xj) 2 [Pro/Pmo]CPE(Xj).
As constructed, these differences measure the emphasis
placed on each penalty combination (relative to remediation








Human cause1 0.112 0.439
(0.088) (0.359)
Other cause1 0.584*** 0.454
(0.142) (0.524)
Transport cause1 0.219** 0.297
(0.104) (0.381)
Technical cause1 0.120 0.320
(0.091) (0.354)
Secondary human cause2 0.008 20.129
(0.064) (0.180)
Measured damages 20.0000007*** 20.000002**
(0.0000002) (0.0000007)
Zero-damages spline 20.848*** 21.822***
(0.060) (0.240)




Agricultural activity4 20.249*** 20.154
(0.066) (0.191)
Other industrial activity4 20.189*** 20.339*
(0.063) (0.190)
Citizen activity4 3.914 6.195
(140.8) (127.0)




Surface-water quality 20.076*** 20.144*
(0.026) (0.085)
Oil contaminant6 20.096 0.203
(0.066) (0.208)
Chemical contaminant6 20.231*** 0.278
(0.082) (0.238)
Number of observations 1,058 381
Normal standard deviation 0.629 0.803
Log-likelihood 2713.178 2136.578
Standard errors noted inside parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical differences from zero at significance levels 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively.
Omitted indicator categories: 15 Unknown/Natural Causes; 25 Not Human Error; 35 1990 or 1992;
4 5 Heavy Industry; 55 Surface Water; 65 Other Contaminant.
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only or monetary fine only) in the transitional market period
relative to the centrally planned period. According to these
estimated measures, as shown in table 5b(ii), water authori-
ties emphasized the use of both penalties relative to the use
of remediation only (that is, imposition of monetary fines,
conditional on a remediation requirement) in neither period,
consistent with hypothesis 1D. In addition, under central
planning, water authorities significantly emphasized the use
of both penalties relative to the use of monetary fines only
(that is, imposition of remediation, conditional on monetary
fine imposition) and the use of remediation only relative to
the use of monetary fines only (that is, imposition of
remediation, conditional on the imposition of at least one
penalty type), consistent with hypothesis 2D.
Penalty Levels: Finally, consider the third decision perspec-
tive regarding penalty levels. Define the following predicted
penalty levels for economic systemj, evaluated atXj, where
j [ 5CPE, MKT6:
r j(Xj) 5 predicted level of medication costs for
economic systemj, and
mj(Xj) 5 predicted level of monetary fines for
economic systemj.
For each penalty type, define the difference between the
predicted level in the MKT system and the predicted level in
the CPE system, evaluated atXj, wherej [ 5CPE, MKT6:
Dr (Xj) 5 rMKT (Xj) 2 rCPE(Xj)
andDm(Xj) 5 mMKT (Xj) 2 mCPE(Xj).
As constructed, these differences measure the emphasis















Mean Values for Centrally Planned Period (1988–1990)
Remediation emphasis DPr(XCPE) 5 21.04 No Yes—1%
Monetary fine emphasis DPm(XCPE) 5 0. 403 No Yes—1%
Mean Values for Transitional Market Period (1991–1992)
Remediation emphasis DPr(XMKT) 5 21.04 No Yes—1%
Monetary fine emphasis DPm(XMKT) 5 0. 322 No Yes—1%
Wald test statistics are 138.99, 19.20, 223.41, and 17.29, for the respective measures in order as shown.














Mean Values for Centrally Planned Period (1988–1990)
Remediation only
emphasis DPro(XCPE) 5 22.587 No Yes—1%
Monetary fine only
emphasis DPmo(XCPE) 5 20.930 No No
Both penalties
emphasis DPb(XCPE) 5 22.753 No No
Mean Values for Transitional Market Period (1991–1992)
Remediation only
emphasis DPro(XMKT) 5 22.450 No Yes—1%
Monetary fine only
emphasis DPmo(XMKT) 5 20.547 No No
Both penalties
emphasis DPb(XMKT) 5 22.131 No No
Wald test statistics are 50.63, 4.41, 23.56, 263.07, 2.46, and 229.91, for the respective measures, in
order.














Mean Values for Centrally Planned Period (1988–1990)
Remediation only
relative to fines




only D[Pb/Pro ](XCPE) 5 0.166 Yes1 No
Both penalties
relative to fines
only D[Pb/Pmo ](XCPE) 5 21.823 No Yes—1%
Mean Values for Transitional Market Period (1991–1992)
Remediation only
relative to fines




only D[Pb/Pro ](XMKT) 5 20.319 Yes1 No
Both penalties
relative to fines
only D[Pb/Pmo ](XMKT) 5 21.584 No Yes—1%
Wald test statistics are 16.63, 0.09, 10.44, 29.86, 0.32, and 41.73, for the respective measures, in order
as shown.
1 Measure not statistically significant from zero at significance levels greater than 50%.
TABLE 5.—(CONTINUED)













Mean Values for Centrally Planned Period (1988–1990)
Remediation costs Dr(XCPE) 5 21,014,310 No Yes—1%
Monetary fine
levels Dm(XCPE) 5 23,026 No No
Remediation costs
relative to fine
levels Dy(XCPE) 5 20.432 No Yes—1%
Mean Values for Transitional Market Period (1991–1992)
Remediation costs Dr(XMKT) 5 2941,601 No Yes—1%
Monetary fines Dm(XMKT) 5 210,953 No No
Remediation costs
relative to fine
levels Dy(XMKT) 5 20.530 No Yes—1%
Wald test statistics are 44.89, 0.0001, 15.27, 49.18, 0.001, and 23.81, for the respective measures, in
order as shown.
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relative to the centrally planned period. According to these
estimated measures, as shown in table 5c, water authorities
significantly emphasized remediation costs under central
planning, consistent with hypothesis 2. In addition, water
authorities emphasized monetary fines in neither period,
inconsistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. This inconclusive
result strengthens the need to examine relative penalty use
by estimating the penalty level ratio.
Estimation of this ratio permits the testing of the modified
hypotheses concerning relative use of penalties. Lety
represent the ratio of remediation costs and total penalty
levels: y 5 r/(r 1 m). Define the difference between the
predicted ratio in the MKT period and CPE period as
follows:
Dy(Xj) 5 yMKT (Xj) 2 yCPE(Xj), wherej [ 5CPE, MKT6.
This difference measures the emphasis placed on remedia-
tion costs as compared to monetary fines in the transitional
market period relative to the centrally planned period. As
shown in table 5c, water authorities significantly empha-
sized remediation costs under central planning and monetary
fines during the capitalist transition, consistent with hypoth-
esis 2C.
C. Interpretation of Empirical Results
Collectively, only one result weakly supports the notion
that monetary fines had some penalizing power under central
planning (case 1) and nearly all reject this notion. Instead,
these results mostly support the notion that monetary fines
had no penalizing power under central planning (case 2).
The most-convincing results involve the use of remediation
requirements, especially the emphasis of remediation cost
levels as compared to monetary fine levels under central
planning relative to the capitalist transition. This conclusion
is consistent with reports on the Czech Republic. According
to World Bank (1992), fines ‘‘when accompanied by soft
budget policies, had no impact on polluters’ behavior.’’
According to Czech Ministry of the Environment (1990),
enterprises’ annual subsidies often included funds ear-
marked to pay monetary fines: ‘‘payments [fines] had been
incorporated into the [production] costs and [product]
prices.’’18
If monetary fines lacked penalizing power under central
planning, why did Czech water authorities impose them at
all? Without any effect on polluters’ behavior, Czech water
authorities could have imposed monetary fines to display
their environmental consciousness to the Czech citizenry
and to Western countries without experiencing any social
costs beyond imposition costs, the practice noted as ‘‘show’’
in Section IIB.19
Modification of the hypotheses to examine the relative use
of penalties proves justified. Water authorities unambigu-
ously emphasized the absolute use of remediation in terms
of both levels and imposition during the centrally planned
period and the absolute imposition of monetary fines in the
transitional market period. However, authorities also empha-
sized the sole use of monetary fines and the joint use of both
penalties during the centrally planned period. (The emphasis
of monetary fines in terms of levels in this period is
statistically insignificant.20) These collective results possibly
indicate a shift in the authorities’ objective towards a greater
concern for enterprises’ financial situations and/or a lesser
desire for ‘‘show’’ in the transitional market period. Con-
trary to conventional wisdom, these results mostly reject the
notion of greater environmental awareness expressed in
stronger enforcement. By examining the relative use of
penalties, the results unambiguously support the relative
emphasis of remediation in the centrally planned period as
predicted under case 2.
V. Summary
This paper uses principal-agent theory to analyze the
optimal mix of monetary- and resource-based penalties in
two economic systems: a centrally planned economy and a
market economy. Principal-agent theory generates two sets
of testable hypotheses concerning the use of each penalty
type in each economic system. One set concerns the absolute
use of penalty types, which is appropriate when the princi-
pal’s objective is sufficiently constant across the two eco-
nomic systems. The other set concerns the relative use of
penalty types, which is appropriate when the principal’s
objective differs sufficiently between the two economic
systems. This paper tests these hypotheses using data on the
enforcement of water-protection laws in the Czech Republic
regarding penalty responses to water-damaging accidents
from 1988 to 1992.
Estimation of enforcement responses follows three differ-
ent decision perspectives: imposition of each penalty type,
selection of a penalty combination, and level of each penalty
type.
Based on the collective results, examining the relative use
of penalties appears justified. Moreover, the collective
results reject the notion that monetary fines had some
penalizing power under central planning, yet they strongly
support the notion that monetary fines had no penalizing
power under central planning. If monetary fines had no
penalizing power under central planning, then why did water
authorities impose them at all? Possibly, the Czech water
authorities used monetary fines for show.
18 Peterson (1993) documents the neutralization of monetary fines by
subsidies in the Soviet case.
19 Peterson (1993) supports the view that protection agencies under
central planning knowingly assigned ineffective monetary fines and more
generally describes the symbolic nature of environmental protection
actions in Soviet-type economies.
20 This result may stem from a seemingly random determination of fine
levels based mostly on political purposes in the centrally planned period.
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